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Abstract
In this paper, we model an overlapping generation economy a¤ected by an un-
expected immigration shock and determine how households would insure them-
selves against "immigration risks" e¢ ciently. We use the model to study the
impact of immigration on (i) the welfare of various generations, (ii) the distri-
butions of income among factors of production, and (iii) the optimal design of
the intergenerational welfare state. In particular, we construct a system of public
education and public pensions that mimics e¢ cient complete market allocation.
We also show the impact of immigration shocks in a small open economy. In this
case, our model suggests that the external capital ows can act as substitutes for
the missing private insurance markets. Our analysis delivers a set of predictions
that we nd useful for understanding certain aspects of the Spanish experience
during 1996 and 2007.
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1. Introduction
In most countries of the developed world, the combination of declining fertility
rates and increasing life expectancies makes immigration ows to developed coun-
tries increasingly important. In fact, immigration is the main source of population
growth in most of these countries. In addition, but perhaps no less important, in
a densely populated world subject to strong climatic pressures, the risk of large
population displacements is greater than ever before. All these aspects make it
increasingly important that the institutions of a country are adapted to migration
shocks.
Given this concern, we are interested in the following questions. What are the
intergenerational economic e¤ects of a large immigration ow? How do households
insure themselves against an immigration shock? How does an immigration shock
a¤ect the welfare of the various generations in the receiving country, both current
and future generations? In particular, how does immigration impact intergener-
ational arrangements such as public education and pensions, which make up the
core of the contemporary welfare state? To begin answering these questions, we
develop a simple theoretical framework with overlapping generations that live for
three periods in which they accumulate human capital in the rst, work in the
second and retire and live o¤ the return from their investments in the third. The
latter includes both physical capital and the resources they lent the young people
to invest in human capital because we allow for this type of lending-borrowing
relationship to be established through nancial markets in our baseline model.
We take immigration shock to be an increase in the size of the middle-aged
generation that engenders, among other things, a reduction in the average human
capital of the labor force. In other words, the immigrants are new middle-aged
workers who are somewhat less skilled than the average natives. The shock lasts
one period after which the economy moves along its new growth path with a larger
number of middle-aged workers. We assume that the children of the immigrants
perfectly integrate. Hence, after one period, the children of immigrants accumu-
late as much per-capita human capital as the o¤spring of the native workers with
the same level of skill. In the context of our model, one period lasts approximately
25-30 years.
Because we are interested in determining how households would insure them-
selves against the "immigration risk," we assume nancial markets are sequentially
complete in the baseline model. Because there are always two possible states of
the world in the next period one with and one without immigration there are
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two nancial assets agents buy from and sell to each other in every period. One
asset pays one unit of consumption only when there is an immigration shock, and
the other pays a unit of consumption only when there is no immigration shock.
Through these two assets, which are accessible to all individuals living in the
country, young and middle-aged people insure themselves from the impact of an
immigration shock. In particular, young people, who will be middle-aged and
working in the next period, would like to insure themselves against the negative
impact that the arrival of immigrants may have on their wages; they do so by
purchasing insurance from the currently middle age people. The latter, who are
saving for retirement, can use the extra payo¤ they would receive from their capi-
tal investment if the immigration shock were realized in the next period to provide
such insurance. The elderly do not accumulate further assets because we assume
that they must die without debt and there is no bequest motive.
The buying and selling of insurance takes place at the same time and through
the same instruments that the middle aged and young use to lend/borrow to/from
each other. More precisely, middle-aged individuals invest in physical capital (by
purchasing assets issued by the competitive rms that carry out production in
the next period) and in human capital (by purchasing assets issued by the young
agents to nance their own education). Because the capital invested in the rms
pays o¤more when there is immigration, it compensates for the lower payo¤ from
the human capital investment accruing to the middle age. This assures that both
young and middle age people implement as much consumption smoothing as it
is feasible in the benchmark complete markets economy; this consumption takes
place when they are middle age and elderly, respectively.
This does not imply perfect consumption smoothing or that some ex-ante
notion of e¢ ciency is satised at the equilibrium of our benchmark model. This
is because agents cannot insure against the risk of being born in a period of high
immigration beforehand. This is a feature of the world that is well captured
by OLG models. Young agents born in a period with a positive immigration
shock are worse o¤ than they would be otherwise because they must compete
with the o¤spring of the immigrants both to borrow funds for investing in human
capital this period and in supplying labor to the market in the next period. We
assume that this type of risk cannot be insured away either. It would be insurable
if parents were altruistic and internalized the future welfare of their children via
bequests. Instead, we assume that parents are selsh and do not leave anything to
their children. Hence, the latter must bear the cost of being born in the "wrong"
period. The extension to the case in which a bequest motive leads parents to
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purchase insurance for the future generations is an interesting venue for future
research.
The key channels through which immigration a¤ects welfare in this economy
is that it increases the labor supply of unskilled workers in the face of a prede-
termined stock of physical capital and skilled workers. This lowers the wages of
unskilled workers and increases both the return on physical capital and the wages
of skilled workers, which shifts income from one part of the population to another.
In this sense, factor prices move around because we have assumed there is zero
mobility of both physical capital and skilled labor in the benchmark model. If
there were perfect mobility of capital and skilled labor, both factors of produc-
tion would ow into the country from the outside on the footsteps of unskilled
immigrant labor and the capital intensity ratios would remain unchanged. In this
case, factor prices would be una¤ected by immigration, which would amount to
nothing more than an increase in the size of the economy. Under constant returns
to scale in production, which we assume, this does not a¤ect the welfare of the
native agents. The capital intensity ratios and the wage per unit of human capital
remain constant. Hence, the salaries of the native do not change at all. This case
is trivial, and we do not consider it.
Nevertheless, if there are frictions in the international nancial markets and
capital adjustment is not instantaneous, i.e., it takes time for the capital stock of
the country to be built up to restore the initial capital intensity ratio, then immi-
gration causes a redistribution between generations as outlined above. The latter
observation suggests that the larger is the trade decit following an immigration
shock, the quicker will be the adjustment toward the old capital intensity ratio
and the smaller the redistribution away from native workers and toward native
owners of capital. This is an interesting result because it suggests that the trade
decit that follows an immigration shock and borrowing from aboard can be a
substitute for the missing internal insurance markets.
We are not the rst to claim a link between immigration ows and interna-
tional capital ows. Other authors have explored this relationship in dynamic
general equilibrium models designed to quantify the impact of immigration on
capital inows and, therefore, on trade decits in small open economies that have
experienced a large immigration wave. Izquierdo, Jimeno and Rojas (2010) and
Gavilán, de Cos, Jimeno and Rojas (2011) constructed and calibrated a large-scale
overlapping generation model for Spain, which is a country that has received a
massive wave of immigration in recent years 1. In both papers, the results indicate
1Spain, which has traditionally been an out-migration country, su¤ered an immigration boom
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that interest rates and immigration are the main factors responsible for the in-
vestment boom and the build-up of a sizable external imbalance witnessed in the
Spanish economy over the period from the mid-1990s to 2008. Another example of
a large immigration shock was Israel following the collapse of the Soviet Union in
the 1990s2. Cohen, Eckstein and Weiss (2012) and Cohen and Hsieh (2001) show
that the average e¤ective wages of native Israelis fell and the return to capital in-
creased during the height of the inux in 1990 and 1991. By 1997, however, both
average wages and the return to capital had returned to pre-immigration levels
due to an investment boom induced by the initial increase in the return to capi-
tal. The investment boom was largely nanced by external borrowing. The model
elaborated in Wilson (2003), is calibrated to the Canadian economic environment
in the years that led to the Great War in which Canada experienced a dramatic
shift in migration patterns3. Again, the results suggest that up to three-quarters
of the increase in the capital formation rate and the foreign capital inow rate
in the Canadian economy over the period of 1899-1911 can be attributed to the
dramatic inow of immigrants over this period.
All these papers are quantitative macroeconomic studies4 of the impact of im-
migration on the host country based on the calibration of a general equilibrium
model in which immigration is a deterministic process. Another example of this
type of model for a closed economy framework is Canovas and Ravn (2000) in
which the authors use an innitely lived agents model to demonstrate that the re-
unication of Germany (an event similar to a mass migration of low-skilled agents
who hold no capital into a foreign country) generated a signicant redistribution
to high-skilled workers and entrepreneurs. Although the papers listed above for-
get human capital accumulation, Eberhard (2012) analyzes the e¤ect in a closed
economy of an unexpected inux of immigrants on the price of skill and hence on
the earnings, human capital accumulation, and educational attainment of native
workers. Nevertheless, Eberhard (2012) abstracts from the e¤ects of migration on
from the late nineties to 2007. The foreign population in Spain increased from 0.35 million (1%
of the total population) in 1995 to 5.22 million (11% of the total population) in 2008.
2From late 1989 through 1996, 670 thousand Russian Jews immigrated to Israel, which
increased the total population of Israel by 11 percent and the labor force by 14 percent.
3Canada went from being a net supplier of migrants to a net receiver of immigrants with a net
immigration rate of 15.1% in the period of 1901-1911 (as a percentage of the 1901 population).
4There is an extensive literature of microeconometric studies of the impact of immigrants on
the labor market performance of native workers. For instance, see Card (2001), Borjas (1999),
Ottaviano and Peri (2006), Hatton and Tani (2005), Gandal, Hanson and Slaughter (2204) and
Cortes (2008).
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physical capital accumulation.
In contrast to the previous literature, our paper has mostly a normative value.
We focus on the design of optimal policies that allow agents to insure against an
immigration risk. In fact, we next ask whether government policies can be used to
substitute for the credit and insurance markets of the baseline model when these
are either absent or largely incomplete as is often the case. To do this, we build on
previous results presented in Boldrin and Montes (2005, 2009), which answered
the question in the a¢ rmative for the case of no immigration shock, and adapt
their framework to the particular circumstances at hand. Under uncertainty, we
need to use the welfare state to also allocate risk e¢ ciently between generations
and heterogeneous agents and not only allow for intergenerational trade as in
deterministic case. In the present case, we show that pension payments and social
security contributions must be negatively indexed to the size of the immigration
ow, but educational expenditures and the issuance of public debt nancing should
be positively correlated. Intuitively, this is because social security contributions
play the role that the repayment of debt plus interest by the currently middle-
aged generation to those that lend them money to invest in human capital
plays in the model with sequentially complete nancial markets. The pension
payments are nothing but these contributions as received by the elderly: they
correspond to the payo¤ from the securities that were traded to nance the human
capital investment of the young generation in the previous period. Likewise, the
educational investment (nanced via the issuance of bonds) corresponds to the
issuance of the same securities in this period, and hence it should increase because
the size of the young generation is larger than expected.
Other authors (Shiller (1999), Bohn (1998, 1999)) have stressed the positive
role of an unfunded social security system as an instrument to e¢ ciently reallocate
the economic impact of aggregate shocks across various generations. They argued
that, if the returns to capital and wages are imperfectly correlated and driven
by an aggregate shock, an unfunded social security system that endows retired
households with a claim to labor income may serve as such a risk sharing tool
between generations. Krueger and Kubler (2005) note that the potentially positive
intergenerational risk sharing role of social security needs to be traded o¤ against
the standard crowding-out e¤ect that unfunded social security has on private
savings and thus capital formation. In a realistically calibrated economy with
stochastic production, they nd that the intergenerational risk sharing role of an
unfunded social security system is dominated in its importance by the adverse
e¤ect on physical capital accumulation that arises from the introduction of such a
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system. Sanchez-Marcos and Sanchez (2004) conrm the ndings of Krueger and
Kubler (2005) for the case of demographic uncertainty.
An important di¤erence between all of these papers and the economy in our
paper is that the authors of these papers abstract from the accumulation of human
capital and, therefore, from the negative e¤ect that missing credit markets has on
education. As we show in section 4 (and in more detail in Boldrin and Montes
(2005)), when credit markets for education are absent and even in the presence of
government-nanced education, there is too much investment in physical capital
with respect to the complete market allocation. This is because public education
allows the working generation to invest in the human capital of future generations,
but it does not allow the former investors to collect the market return from their
beneciaries. This will generally lead to an ine¢ ciency: investment in physical
capital is too high and there is less intergenerational consumption smoothing than
under the complete market allocation. In this sense, the introduction of a PAYGO
system in which social security contributions correspond to the capitalized value of
education services received is a tool for "e¢ ciently" crowding-out physical capital.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the bench-
mark model. In Section 3, we show the e¤ects of the absence of credit and insur-
ance markets. In Section 4, we look at the e¢ cient welfare state in the presence
of immigration and in a closed economy with incomplete markets. In Section 5,
we look at an open economy with incomplete nancial markets but with pub-
lic education and pensions. Section 6 concludes the paper with some practical
considerations about the Spanish experience.
2. The basic model
We use an OLG model with two types of agents in each generation who live
for three periods: youth, middle age, and old age. Agents di¤er in the level of
productive skills they inherit: high (H) and low (L).
There is aggregate uncertainty due to an immigration ow that may increase
the size of the low-skill middle-aged group, which a¤ects the total supply of labor,
the wage rates, the return on capital, the aggregate output and the size of future
generations.
We use the superscripts, y, m and o to denote young, middle-aged and elderly
people, respectively, and the superscripts i = H;L to denote high and low human
capital. The population structure in period t is (Nyt ; N
m
t ; N
o
t ), with N
y
t = N
yH
t +
NyLt ; N
m
t = N
mH
t + N
mL
t and N
o
t = N
oH
t + N
oL
t . Additionally, N
mH
t = N
yH
t 1,
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NmLt = (1 + zt)N
yL
t 1 and N
yi
t = (1 + n)N
mi
t for i = H;L, where  1 < n, and zt
is the realization of the immigration shock in period t. For simplicity, we assume
that the shock z follows a two-state Markow process with state space Z = fz; 0g,
z > 0. The notation (zt+1jzt) denotes the probability of zt+1 2 Z given zt.
In each period t = 0; 1; :::; a new generation Nyt = (1 + n)N
m
t is born. Each
type i = H;L is born with a per-capita endowment of basic knowledge, hyit ,
which is an input to the production of future human capital, according to hmit+1 =
h(dit; h
yi
t ). We denote the physical resources invested in the education of a young
individual of type i in period t with dit; we assume h
yH
t > h
yL
t . The function
h(d; hy) is a constant returns to scale neoclassical production function. During
the second period of life, individuals work and decide how much of their income to
consume, how much to save, and how to allocate the latter among various nancial
instruments. When they are elderly, individuals have no decisions to make: they
consume all their income and then die. We assume agents draw utility from
consumption when middle age and elderly. We also assume immigrants enter the
country with the same human capital as the low-skill middle-aged natives and
with zero capital or nancial assets. Consumption when young, leisure, and the
welfare of descendants do not a¤ect lifetime utility.
The initial conditions are: K0, for the capital stock; (N
yi
0 ; N
mi
0 ; N
oi
0 ); for the
population; hmi0 ; for the human capital of the middle age individuals; A
yi
 1(0) and
Ami 1(0); for the portfolios of middle-aged and elderly people, respectively; and
Af 1(0); for that of the representative rm, which owns K0. Finally, we assume
there are no immigrants in the rst period.
The preferences of an individual of type i, born in period t  1, are
Et 1

u(cmi(zt)) + Et

u(coi(zt+1))
	
;
where  is the period discount factor, and E is the expectation operator. The
function u : <+  ! < is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave and
C2.
2.1. Market structure
Normalize to one the price of output in the initial period, in which the state
is z = 0; write pt(z) for the price of output in period t and state z 2 Z in
all subsequent periods. We assume sequentially complete nancial markets, i.e.,
given the current state zt and the set Z of possible future states, for all z 2 Z, there
is a competitive market in which contingent claims At (z) are traded with a payo¤
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in the units of the next periods consumption, b[At (z) ; zt+1] = 1 if zt+1 = z, and
zero otherwise. We assume agents cannot die in debt, i.e., we impose Amit (z)  0
for all t and z with i = H;L. Let q (z; zt) be the price, in units of consumption at
t, of asset A (z) in period t and state zt. To save notation, the symbol At (z) also
indicates the number of units of that asset traded in a given period.
2.2. Firms
There is a representative rm, which uses physical capital and the two types
of human capital to produce output according to Yt = F (Kt; Ht; Lt), where
Ht = h
mH
t N
mH
t , Lt = h
mL
t N
mL
t ; and F (K;H;L) is a constant returns to scale
neoclassical production function. We assume a full depreciation of capital and
that high-skill workers are more productive than low-skill workers, everything else
equal, i.e., FH (K;X;X) > FL (K;X;X). Firms last one period and own the
physical capital, which they nance by issuing state-contingent securities. More
specically, in each period t the representative rm issues securities Aft (z) at a
price of q(z; zt), for z 2 fz; 0g, with the proceedings of which they purchase Kt+1,
which is used for production in the next period. In period t+1, after the realiza-
tion of the shock, the rm hires workers, carries out production, pays o¤ wages,
honors its nancial liabilities and then dissolves.
Let wi(zt) be the nominal wage in period t and state zt 2 Z for an agent of
type i = H;L. Write wi(zt)=p(zt) = !i(zt) and '(zt) = p(zt)FK(Kt; Ht; L(zt)):
The problem of the rm is
max
Aft (zt+1);Ht+1;Lt+1
Et
n
p(zt+1)
h
Y (zt+1)  !H(zt+1)Ht+1   !L(zt+1)L(zt+1)  Aft (zt+1)
io
subject to,
Y (zt+1) = F (Kt+1; Ht+1; L(zt+1))
Kt+1 =
X
z2Z
q(z; zt)A
f
t (z):
The rst order conditions for H;L and for Af (z) are
!H(zt+1) = FH (Kt+1; Ht+1; L(zt+1)) 8 zt+1 2 Z (1.a)
!L(zt+1) = FL (Kt+1; Ht+1; L(zt+1)) 8 zt+1 2 Z (1.b)
q(z; zt) =
(zjzt)pt+1(z)P
z2Z (zjzt)'t+1(z)
8 z 2 Z: (1.c)
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2.3. Consumers
For a native agent of type i = H;L born in period t   1 when the state is zt 1,
the lifetime optimization problem is
max
di(zt 1);Ayit 1(z);A
mi
t (z)
Et 1

u(cmi(zt)) + Et

u(coi(zt+1))
	
subject to,
di(zt 1) +
X
z2Z
q(z; zt 1)A
yi
t 1(z)  0 (2:a)
cmi(zt) +
X
z2Z
q(z; zt)A
mi
t (z) = !
i(zt)h
mi
t + A
yi
t 1(zt) 8zt 2 Z (2:b)
coi(zt+1) = A
mi
t (zt+1) 8zt+1 2 Z (2:c)
hmit = h
 
di(zt 1); h
yi
t 1

(2:d)
The rst order conditions for the choice of Ayi(zt 1) = fAyit 1 (z), for all z 2 Zg
and di(zt 1) reduce to
q(z; zt 1) =
(zjzt 1)u0(cmit (z))P
z2Z (zjzt 1)u0(cmit (z))!it(z)hd
 
di(zt 1); h
yi
t 1
 8z 2 Z (3:a)
1 =
X
z2Z
q(z; zt 1)!it(z)hd
 
di(zt 1); h
yi
t 1

: (3:b)
For each of the Amit (z), the rst order condition reads
q(z; zt) =
(zjzt)u0(coit+1(z))
u0(cmi(zt))
8z 2 Z: (3:c)
For a middle-aged immigrant who arrives in the state of the world zt with human
capital hmt = h
mL
t and A
y
t 1(zt) = 0, the maximization problem is
max
Amt (z)
u(cm(zt)) + Et [u(c
o(zt+1))]
subject to,
cm(zt) +
X
z2Z
q(z; zt) A
m
t (z) = !
L(zt)h
m
t (4.a)
co(zt+1) = A
m
t (zt+1) 8zt+1 2 Z: (4.b)
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The rst order conditions that determine Am(zt) are analogous to those in (3.c):
q(z; zt) =
(zjzt)u0(cot+1(z))
u0(cm(zt))
8z 2 Z: (4.c)
2.4. Financial markets
It should be clear from the budget constraint that the net nancial position of the
young is non-positive (i.e.,
P
z2Z q(z; zt 1)A
yi
t 1(z)  0 for i = H;L) and the net
nancial position of the middleaged is non-negative (i.e.,
P
z2Z q(z; zt)A
mi
t (z) 
0 for i = H;L and
P
z2Z q(z; zt) A
m
t (z)  0). When the latter is positive, it
corresponds to aggregate national savings, which is invested in the physical capital
of rms and in the education of the young agents. The rst order conditions for
the prot maximization of the representative rm imply
q(z; zt) =
(zjzt)pt+1(z)P
z2Z (zjzt)'t+1(z)
for each z 2 Z: (1.c)
Multiplying (1:c) by FK(Kt+1; Ht+1; Lt+1(z)) and aggregating over z 2 Z we ob-
tain X
z2Z
q (z; zt)FK(Kt+1; Ht+1; Lt+1(z)) = 1: (5)
2.5. Competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a mapping from the current state of the world into a
distribution of quantities and prices at all t. Given an initial condition (K0; H0; L0),
z0,
 
N oi0 ; N
mi
0 ; N
yi
0

, (Ayi 1 (z0) ; A
mi
 1 (z0) ; A
f
 1 (z0)), with i = H;L; and a sequence
of exogenous basic knowledges
n
hyHt (z); h
yL
t (z)
o1
t=0
, a competitive equilibrium is
a collection of the following:
1. choices of the native,

dit(z); c
mi
t (z); c
oi
t (z); A
yi
t (z) ; A
mi
t (z)
	1
t=0
, i = H;L,
and immigrant,

cmt (z); c
o
t (z);
Amt (z)
	1
t=0
, households;
2. choices of the representative rm,
n
Kt(z); Ht(z); Lt(z); A
f
t (z)
o1
t=0
; and
3. prices, fpt(z); q(z; zt)g1t=0 and

!Ht (z); !
L
t (z); 't (z)
	1
t=0
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such that, for all t and z 2 Z, the consumers and the rm maximize their
payo¤s and the markets clear.
In each period t and state z there are three sets of markets to clear:
i) Output market:
Cmt (z) + C
o
t (z) +Dt (z) +Kt+1 (z) = F (Kt; Ht; Lt (z)) : (6:a)
where Cmt (z) and C
o
t (z) are the aggregate consumption of the middle-aged
and old, respectively, in period t and state z; and Dt (z) is aggregate physical
resources invested in education in period t and state z.
ii) Labor market:
Ht = h
mH
t N
yH
t 1; (6:b)
Lt (z) = h
mL
t (1 + z)N
yL
t 1:
iii) Capital market:
X
z2Z
q(z; zt)A
f
t (z) = Kt+1;
Aft (z) =
X
i=H;L
Amit (z)N
yi
t 1 + A
m
t (z) ztN
yL
t 1 +
X
i=H;L
Ayit (z)N
yi
t ;X
i=H;L
di (zt)N
yi
t =  
X
i=H;L
X
z2Z
q(z; zt)A
yi
t (z)N
yi
t : (6:c)
For each state z 2 Z, the payo¤ from security Aft (z) is
b[Aft (z); zt+1 = z]A
f
t (z) = F (Kt+1; Ht+1; Lt+1 (z))  !Ht+1(z)Ht+1   !Lt+1(z)Lt+1(z)
= FK(Kt+1; Ht+1; Lt+1(z))Kt+1: (6:d)
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2.6. Numerical Evaluation
In Appendix A, we study an analytical illustration of our model in which the
following specication of our key functions is used5: u(c) = log c; F (K;H;L) =
AKHL1   and h (di; hyi) = B(di) (hyi)1 .
Our main purpose in this section is to consider the practical implications of
an immigration shock in a world with complete markets using a numerical eval-
uation of the economy in Appendix A. To do this, we assign reasonable values
to each parameter and provide a numerical computation of the impact of an
immigration shock. We compare two economies: an economy with no immigra-
tion (z0; z1; z2; :::) = (0; 0; 0; :::) and another with only one immigration shock
(z0; z1; z2; :::) = (0; z; 0; :::). We normalize Nm0 = 1 with N
mH
0 = 0:6 and assume
an annual growth rate of the population equal to 0. Recall that a period in this
model is approximately 30 years. We assume z = 0:4 and (zjzt) = (0jzt) = 0:5.
With respect to the production technology,  is xed to 0:3;  = 0:45; and the scale
parameter A is xed at 1. In the human capital technology, we set  = 0:13; which
corresponds to an elasticity of output of 0:058 with respect to education for a high
human capital worker and 0:0325 for a low human capital worker. The discount
factor  is set to match an average ratio of investment over output I=Y = 21:9%.
This yields a value of  = 0:904, which corresponds to an annual discount factor
of 0:996641. We set the scale parameter B equal to 4:35 to obtain an annual rate
of aggregate output growth equal to 3% along the balance growth path. With
these parameter values we have an annual interest rate of 4:1%. The fraction of
total output spent to nance education (D=Y ) is equal to 6:3%, which is on the
low side for the US but not for most European countries, including Spain.
Assume the same initial conditions for both economies and assume they are on
their balance growth path from the start. In Table 1, we show the welfare changes
expressed as equivalent variation in consumption caused by an immigration shock
in period t = 1 (where Git 1, i = H;L, denote the generation born in period t  1
with skill i). To disaggregate the e¤ects of the shock along the life cycle of an
5We have used a particular case of a more general production function, Y = AKE1 ,
with E a CES aggregate of various types of labor of the form E =
h
aH
 1
 + (1  a)L 1
i 
 1
,
where  > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution between workers with various skills and a
(1   a) is high (low) skill-specic productivity level. We have assumed  = 1; and therefore
we get E = HaL1 a. The sign of FHL depends on the elasticity of substitution. If  < 1=
then FHL > 0 and, therefore, immigration has a positive e¤ect on high human capital wages.
In any case, with immigration, the capital labor ratio (K/E) falls, which increases the return of
physical capital and decreases the marginal productivity of aggregate labor (E).
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individual, we also shown the change in consumption of middle-aged and elderly
agents induced by the immigration shock in Table 1. First, notice that the middle-
aged and elderly generations that are alive when the shock hits consume more in
this period than in the economy with no shock because the output is much higher
during that period and the insurance mechanism redistributes this extra income
to both middle-aged and elderly people. Therefore, elderly generations that are
alive when immigrations arrive are better o¤.
Table 1: Welfare gains of an immigration shock in t=1.
Equivalent variation in consumption6 Change in consumption
(%) (%)
t GHt 1 G
L
t 1 c
mH
t c
mL
t c
oH
t c
oL
t
0 0.48 0.48 0 0 0 0
1 0.69 0.69 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
2 13.16 -19.17 13.25 -19.11 0.34 0.34
3 13.03 -19.29 13.05 -19.25 13.05 -19.25
4 13.00 -19.29 13.00 -19.28 13.00 -19.28
5 12.99 -19.30 12.99 -19.29 12.99 -19.29
6 12.99 -19.30 12.99 -19.30 12.99 -19.30
7 12.99 -19.30 12.99 -19.30 12.99 -19.30
Nevertheless, future generations with low human capital are worse o¤ in the
economy with a shock because insurance against the immigration shock cannot be
purchased before being born, and they pay the price of having low human capital
income competing with them. The immigration shock negatively a¤ects the low
human capital workers of future generations because their wages are smaller along
the transition to the new balanced growth path and positively e¤ects the high
human capital workers of future generations because their wages are higher along
the same path. Depending on the choice of parameter values, a second e¤ect may
or may not push in the same direction: immediately after the shock hits, there is
"too much" L and "too little" of both H and K relative to the balanced growth
6We compute the fraction of additional consumption along the life cycle that we must give to
or take away from an individual in an economy with no shock so that the welfare in the economy
with no immigration shock is the same as in the economy with an immigration shock.
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ratios. As H and K accumulates toward the desired level and to the extent that
this takes place at various speeds depending on the parameter values, there may
be "too little" H and "too much" K for some periods during the transition. This
further increases the wages of the high human capital workers, and decreases the
marginal productivity of capital relative to their levels in the economy without a
shock.
It is important to note that such e¤ects depend on the presence or absence of
certain nancial markets that various generations may use to purchase insurance:
i) The low human capital workers who are alive during the transition periods
are worse o¤ because the immigration shock took place before they were
born, and so they could not insure against it. Because there are "too many"
of them during the transition, their lifetime income is lower than in the
absence of the shock.
ii) The rapid increase in the stock ofK immediately after the immigration shock
hits is due to the presence of the nancial assets that allow the living middle-
aged workers to prot from the shock. Because they share in the bounty with
the owners of physical capital, their disposable income increases, and this
allows them to immediately invest more in K, which immediately surges.
Simple calculations show that, absent the nancial instruments that allow
middle-aged workers to share in it, the extra output that accrues to rms
in the form of an increase in the productivity of K would go to only the
owners of K, i.e., the elderly retirees. They would consume it all instead
of investing part in tomorrows stock of capital, which is instead what the
middle-aged people do with their share. In an economy without this type
of nancial assets, this means that the rate of return on capital increases
immediately after the shock hits and then slowly decreases toward its long
run position. In our economy, instead, the rate of return on capital increases
at the time of the shock and decreases a period later (when investment
surges) to converge from below to its long run position because high human
capital is accumulated much more slowly than is physical capital. To put
it di¤erently, the hypothesis of sequentially complete nancial markets has
testable aggregate implications.
In Table 2, we show the e¤ect of the shock on the annual rate of return on cap-
ital and growth rates. In Figure 1, we show the e¤ect of the shock on wages. As
argued, the immigration shock has a positive e¤ect on the investment rate in the
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period in which the immigrants arrive and a temporarily negative (positive) e¤ect
on low (high) human capital labor productivity. Capital productivity increases
in the period in which the immigrants arrive and then decreases and stays tem-
porarily below its value in the economy without shocks. After the adjustment is
completed, the growth rate and the marginal productivities resume their original
long-run levels.
Table 2: Annual return on capital rt
and growth rate of GDP gY :
t rt (%) gY (%)
0 4.10 3.02
1 4.39 3.31
2 4.08 3.16
3 4.09 3.02
4 4.10 3.02
0 4 8
12 16 20 24 28
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Immigration shock in period t=1.
Figure 1: Percentage deviations of wages
per efficient unit of human capital.
wH
wL
It is important to note that ours is a model of endogenous growth driven
by constant returns to scale in the three reproducible factors. The long run
growth rate does not depend on the size of the economy, which increases after the
immigration shock, but only on the technology and preference parameters. Once
the low-skill labor supply increases, equilibrium dictates that an extra amount
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of output must be allocated to endow these workers and their o¤spring with
physical capital and high human capital in all periods following the shock period.
Hence, savings rates must temporarily increase until the factor proportions return
to the balanced growth levels after which growth resumes at the same rate as
in the economy without shock. Because the additional investment that is made
necessary by the shock reduces (increases) the consumption of low (high) human
capital agents for a few periods after which consumption grows at the same rate
as in the original equilibrium path, the new path will always stay below (above)
the original one for the low (high) human capital individuals. Hence, consumption
levels will di¤er forever despite growing at the same rate. This explains the lower
(higher) steady state utility for the representative low (high) human capital agent
in the economy with the immigration shock7.
3. Equilibrium when credit and insurance markets are miss-
ing
The results obtained here are consistent with those reported in Boldrin andMontes
(2005). Nevertheless, adding heterogeneity to each generation and adding un-
certainty regarding the size and composition of the next cohort of middle-aged
workers enriches the model and makes it possible to ask a number of new and
interesting question. More precisely, one would want to distinguish the study
of what happens (1) when there are not markets to insure against unexpected
immigration shocks from (2) what happens when there are no markets for lend-
ing/borrowing across generations and over time. This leads us to consider the
following two cases separately.
1. Young people cannot trade the security Ay (z), but they can borrow to in-
vest d in human capital. Because there are no state contingent assets, they
must repay their debt at a xed interest rate regardless of whether there
7To simplify the analysis, we have considered only a one-o¤ immigration shock. It is easy
to see that, if we considered a model with a negative shock (part of the low skilled workers
emigrates to a foreign country), the labor supply of unskilled workers decreases in the face of a
predetermined stock of physical capital and skilled workers. Therefore, the e¤ects of a negative
shock on factor prices, aggregate variables and the welfare of future generations are opposite.
In this sense, the transition to the new balance growth path could be faster and the e¤ects of
a positive shock could be partially reversed by a subsequent negative shock (of a similar size).
Previous simulations conrm these results.
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is an immigration shock in the next period. In other words, they can bor-
row, but they cannot insure. In this case, even if the middle-aged people
attempted to trade in state contingent Am (z) assets, this would not work
because of a lack of a counterpart. The only entity they could trade those
assets with is the rm, which cannot insure them against anything because
it has no compensating sources of income in bad states. The income of el-
derly people is now equal to the xed return on d plus the random return
on capital investment. Because these are linearly independent returns and
there are only two states of the world, middle-aged people can still use a
portfolio composed of "educational bonds" and "shares of the rm" to fully
insure their elderly consumption (for certain parameter congurations this
may require taking a negative position in one of the two assets, which is an
impossibility in this environment). However, this result is special because
it follows from the simplifying assumption of only two immigration states,
which makes spanning possible with just two assets. In either case, when
insurance markets are absent, the young people bear all the risk because
they must reimburse a xed amount d(1 + r); when they reach middle age
regardless of the state of the world. This implies that, when there is immi-
gration, low human capital middle-aged natives have less income to consume
and save than in the complete markets case. As in the world with complete
markets, their wage bill is lower, but their debt payment is higher, which
leaves less for cmL(zt) +
P
z2Z q(z; zt)A
mL
t (z). Therefore, their lifetime util-
ity is lower. On the contrary, high human capital middle-aged natives have
more income to consume and save than in the complete markets case (their
wage bill is higher, as in the world with complete markets, but their debt
payment is lower). Additionally, aggregate net labor income is lower, and
therefore, total investment decreases.
2. Young people cannot borrow at all. Hence, middle-aged people can invest in
only the physical capital. Obviously, this implies that there is a much lower
level of human capital in the economy and that there is no growth. In this
case, "workers" bear all the downside risk (i.e., they either do "normal" or
do "worse"), but the owners of capital bear all the upside (i.e., they either
do "normal" or do "better").
Because both these results are quite straightforward, we skip the mathematical
details and move on to consider whether and how such ine¢ ciencies could be
alleviated with some type of "welfare state" intervention.
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4. The Welfare State of a Closed Economy
4.1. Missing credit and insurance markets
Let us begin with case 2 of the previous section in which all credit and insurance
markets other than the market for purchasing physical capital have been shut
down. In this case, FK(K;H;L), FH(K;H;L) and FL(K;H;L) are all a¤ected by
the immigration shock, and no factor owner can insure against it. We want to de-
rive policies capable of implementing the sequentially complete market allocation
(SCMA) of Section 2. They turn out to be not very di¤erent from those derived
in Boldrin and Montes (2005), apart from the fact that contributions and benets
are now state contingent.
In particular, in Boldrin and Montes (2005), the young "borrow" from the
middle-aged via the public education system, and they pay back the debt at
the market interest rate via a social security tax the proceeds of which nance
pension payments8. Under uncertainty, we need to use the welfare state to also
allocate risk e¢ ciently between generations and heterogeneous agents and not
just to allow for intergenerational trade as in the deterministic case. Think of
what happens when there is an unexpected ow of immigrants (z = z): the
marginal productivity of low human capital labor decreases, and the marginal
productivity of high human capital and physical capital increase. If we simply
levy a social security contribution in the amount of tpit = d
i
t 1 (1 + r

t ) where
rt is the market interest rate (starred symbols refer to the SCMA quantities in
the remainder of the paper) and nothing else, the disposable per capita income
of the low (high) human capital middle-aged individuals decreases (increases)
compared to the SCMA. Furthermore, the amount by which the savings of this
group decrease is not compensated by the increased saving of the high human
capital workers, which implies an under-investment in physical capital compared
to the SCMA.
Therefore, there are potential gains from risk sharing among various agents.
We should stress here a relatively delicate point: an immigration shock causes ag-
gregate uncertainty (it increases aggregate output), but part of that uncertainty
is insurable because it a¤ects the three factors of production di¤erently. In par-
ticular, the native low human capital workers face the risk of a reduced per capita
income, and the native high human capital workers and capital owners face a
8As in Boldrin and Montes (2005), we assume exogenous debt constraint. See Andolfatto
and Gervais (2006) and Lochner and Monge (2011) for problems related to endogenous debt
constraint.
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larger per capita income. If there is no immigration, the opposite is true. Said it
di¤erently, it is often the case that aggregate risk obtains from the composition
of various individual risks and this has clear redistributional consequences. Some
people gain and some loose even from "aggregate" shocks. Then, insurance must
work the following way: when there is immigration, the elderly (the owners of
capital) pay something to the native middle-aged people, and vice versa in the
other periods. Additionally, depending on parameter values, the native high hu-
man capital workers may or may not have to transfer something to the native
low human capital workers: this will depend on how large their income gains are
relative to the aggregate increase in output. Therefore, to implement the SCMA,
the social planner needs to emulate the way in which intergenerational insurance
markets would work.
Assume a period-by-period balanced budget and introduce two tax and trans-
fer schemes; we call the rst a "pension scheme" and the second an "education
scheme." For each zt 2 Z, writeX
i=H;L
tpi (zt)N
yi
t 1 + t
p (zt) ztN
yL
t 1 =
X
i=H;L
bi (zt)N
yi
t 2 +b (zt) zt 1N
yL
t 2
for the pension scheme andX
i=H;L
tei (zt)N
yi
t 1 + t
e (zt) ztN
yL
t 1 =
X
i=H;L
ei (zt)N
yi
t
for the education scheme. Let us start from the last equation. Here, ei (zt) denotes
the educational transfer received from each member i of the current young gener-
ation when the aggregate shock is zt. On the other side of the budget constraint,
we nd the contributions provided by the middle-aged natives (tei (zt)) and by the
middle-aged immigrants (te (zt)). In the optimal policy, we treat working native
di¤erently because they receive a di¤erent net income during middle age. The
optimal policy also dictates treating young people di¤erently in light of their dif-
ferent endowment of basic knoldwedge without di¤erentiating between native and
immigrants.
The budget constraint for the pension scheme can be interpreted similarly, but
we need treating natives and immigrants di¤erently on both sides. They make
di¤erent contributions (tpi (zt) and tp (zt), respectively) and receive di¤erent bene-
ts when retired, bi (zt) and b (zt). Again, this mimics what would have happened
in an economy similar to that of section 2 when markets were dynamically com-
plete. The important point is that the contribution and benet rates are state
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contingent in both schemes, i.e., they change depending on the immigration ow.
The latter is an aggregate variable, and hence the state contingent policy does not
depend on any private information but on a state variable that should, at least in
principle, be observable by the policy maker.
Under these policies, the budget constraints for a representative member of
the generation born in period t  1 become
di(zt 1)  ei(zt 1)
cmi(zt) + s
i(zt) = !
i(zt)h(d
i(zt 1); h
yi
t 1)  tei(zt)  tpi(zt) 8zt 2 Z
coi(zt+1) = s
i(zt)R(zt+1) + b
i(zt+1) 8zt+1 2 Z
The symbol si(zt) is the investment in physical capital an individual of type i =
H;L makes in period t and state zt, and R(zt+1) = (1 + r(zt+1)) is the return
factor on saving in state zt+1.
For an immigrant who arrives in period t, the budget constraints read
cm (zt) + s(zt) = !
L(zt)h
m
t   te(zt)  tp(zt);
co(zt+1) = s(zt)R(zt+1) + b (zt+1) 8zt+1 2 Z:
If we set ei(zt 1) = di(zt 1) (starred symbols refer to the SCMA), i.e., we trans-
fer educational resources to the young generation up to the point at which the
expected return on education is equal to the expected return on physical capital,
X
z2Z
(zjzt 1)pt (z)Rt (z) =
X
z2Z
(zjzt 1)pt (z)!it(z)hd
 
di(zt 1); h
yi
t 1

;
we reach the e¢ cient level of human capital in period t. In Boldrin and Montes
(2005), we show (in a world with no immigration shocks and with homoge-
nous agents) that, in a deterministic world, this policy, tpi(zt) = dit 1R
(zt) and
bi(zt) = t
ei
t 1R
(zt) implements the e¢ cient CMA overall. Pension benets re-
ceived (social security contributions paid) should correspond to the capitalized
value of the lifetime contributions to aggregate human capital accumulation paid
(educational services received). However, this policy is not enough to implement
the appropriate amount of intergenerational risk sharing when random shocks af-
fect the size of the working population. We need to add a second mechanism that
allocates risk between generations.
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Comparison of the last budget restrictions with the budget restrictions of the
SCMA, (2:a)-(2:d) ; shows that, if the lump-sum tax-transfer amounts satisfy
tpi(zt) =  Ayit 1 (zt) ; tp(zt) = 0;
bi(zt+1) = A
mi
t (zt+1)  i(zt)Kt+1R(zt+1);
b(zt+1) = A
m
t (zt+1)  (zt)Kt+1R(zt+1);
and
tei(zt) = ~A
mi (zt)  i(zt)Kt+1; te(zt) = eAm(zt)  (zt)Kt+1;
where i(zt) and 

(zt) with i
i(zt)N
yi
t 1 + 

(zt)ztN
yL
t 1 = 1 are the shares of
each type of middle-aged individual in the aggregate investment, then the SCMA
is achieved. Note how public policy operates here: the pension system implements
the e¢ cient investment in physical and human capital by "crowding-out" private
savings through social security contributions.
We can interpret the e¢ cient pension system as one with two components,
which are described below.
bi(zt) = t
ei (zt 1)R(zt)| {z }
b^i(zt)
+

Amit 1 (zt)  ~Ami (zt 1)R(zt)

| {z }
~bi(zt)
;
tpi (zt) = d
i (zt 1)R(zt)| {z }btpi(zt)  
 
Ayit 1 (zt) + d
i (zt 1)R(zt)
| {z }
~tpi(zt)
:
The rst component (b^i (zt) ;btpi (zt)) is used to repay the capitalized value of
the educational debt to the lender. The second component

~bi (zt) ; ~t
pi (zt)

is an
insurance contract through which the native middle-aged and elderly generations
share the immigration risk9. The signs of ~bi (zt) and ~tpi (zt) depend on the real-
ization of the shock: when immigration is positive, ~bi (z) < 0 for i = H;L and
i~t
pi (z)Nyit 1 > 0, which reects a transfer from retirees to workers; the opposite
occurs in the other case. Additionally, depending on the technological parameters
9For an immigrant we have btp (zt) = etp (zt) = 0; bb (zt) = te (zt 1)R(zt) and eb (zt) =
Amt 1 (zt)  eAm (zt 1)R(zt).
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values, the native high human capital workers may or may not have to transfer
something to the native low human capital workers: this will depend on how large
their income gains are relative to the aggregate increase in output.
Consider now the case in which, instead of nancing education via taxation, the
government issues one-period, ear-marked debt in the amount of i=H;Ldi (zt)N
yi
t
in each period. In the following period, the government pays back
i=H;Ld
i (zt)R (zt+1)N
yi
t +i=H;L~b
i (zt+1)N
yi
t 1+
eb (zt+1) ztNyLt 1 to the debt hold-
ers (where ~bi (zt+1) = Amit (zt+1)  ~Ami (zt)R(zt+1) and eb (zt+1) = Amt (zt+1) eAm (zt)R(zt+1)). Also in this case, the repayment is nanced by a tax on the
middle-aged individuals who is also computed by adding two components. The
rst component is proportional to the previous use of public education nancing.
The second component again, is for intergenerational insurance. Notice that the
net present value of this tax is e¤ectively a lump sum for the middle-aged worker
because it depends on only actions taken when the workers are young and on the
realization of an exogenous state of the world. In particular, it is not a¤ected by
individuals labor supply decisions. In this scheme, the government e¤ectively acts
as a (somewhat special) nancial institution that issues the missing securities and
uses its taxing power to enforce repayment that are e¢ ciently state contingent10.
4.2. Missing insurance markets
The previous analysis shows that in case 1 of section 3, i.e., when agents have ac-
cess to credit markets to nance education but insurance is not o¤ered, a PAYGO
pension system that always transfers resources from workers to retirees is not
e¢ cient. In the absence of private insurance markets, we need a system of inter-
generational tax transfers contingent on the realization of the immigration shock.
Call this ~tpi (zt) ;~bi (zt) ;eb (zt) for i = H;L. The balanced budget of this system
reads X
i=H;L
~tpi (zt)N
yi
t 1 +
X
i=H;L
~bi (zt)N
yi
t 2 +
eb (zt) zt 1NyLt 2 = 0:
10It is important to note that, in general and particularly in Europe, the generosity of the
welfare state plays an important role in migration decisions. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that
the present value of net welfare state receipts is zero for the individuals under the optimal welfare
state policy described in this paper.
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The budget constraints for a member i = L;H of the generation born in period
t  1 become
di(zt 1)  ei(zt 1)
cmi(zt) + s
i(zt) = !
i(zt)h(d
i(zt 1); h
yi
t 1)  di(zt 1)R(zt) + ~tpi(zt) 8zt 2 Z
coi(zt+1) = s
i(zt)R(zt+1) + ~b
i(zt+1) 8zt+1 2 Z;
where si(zt) includes investment in both physical and human capital. For an
immigrant who arrives in period t, the budget constraints read
cm(zt) + s(zt) = !
L(zt)h
m
t
co(zt+1) = s(zt)R(zt+1) +
eb (zt+1) 8zt+1 2 Z:
Market clearing isX
i=H;L
si(zt)N
yi
t 1 + s(zt)ztN
yL
t 1 = Kt+1 +
X
i=H;L
di(zt)N
yi
t :
To implement the SCMA, we must set
~bi (zt) = A
mi
t 1 (zt)  ~Ami (zt 1)R(zt)eb (zt) = Amt 1 (zt)  eAm (zt 1)R(zt) and
~tpi(zt) = A
yi
t 1 (zt) + d
i (zt 1)R(zt):
Numerical Evaluation (Continued). To provide a better understanding of
how intergenerational insurance operates, we return to the log and Cobb Douglas
economy of Appendix A. On the one hand, in the SCMA, the return on the savings
of the middle-aged generation in period t + 1 is Et

't+1 (z)
	
=p (zt+1) when the
shock is zt+1. In an economy without insurance markets, the return on the savings
is R(zt+1) = ' (zt+1) =p (zt+1). On the other hand, in the SCMA, the net income
during middle age is equal to Et 1

pt (z)!
i
t(z)h
mi
t   dit 1't (z)
	
=p (zt), but in
an economy without insurance, the net income during middle age is equal to
!i(zt)h
mi
t   dit 1R (zt). Let I i(zt) = !i(zt)hmit   di(zt 1)R(zt) be the labor income
net of educational debt. To implement the SCMA, we must pick
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~bi (zt+1) = s
i(zt)R(zt+1)

Et't+1 (z) =p (zt+1)
R(zt+1)
  1

and
~tpi(zt) = I
i(zt)

Et 1 fpt (z) I i(z)g =p (zt)
I i(zt)
  1

:
The public policy that mimics the e¢ cient insurance contract dictates that the
welfare state compensate for the deviations from the expected net total income.
In this sense, elderly individuals in period t+ 1 must pay/receive a percentage of
her capital income equal to the percent of deviation between the expected return
factor on savings in real terms, Et't+1 (z) =p (zt+1), and the real return factor on
savings in period t+1, R(zt+1), when the shock is zt+1. When there is immigration,
this di¤erence is negative, and therefore, the elderly generation must pay some-
thing to the working generation. Regarding the middle-aged generation in period
t, the e¢ cient insurance contract says that working people must pay/receive a
percentage of her net labor income in real terms equal to the percentage deviation
between the expected labor income net of educational debt in real terms and the
real net labor income in period t when the shock is zt. In the economy of the ex-
ample of Appendix A, ~bit (z) =(s
i(zt 1)Rt(z)) = ~t
pH
t (z)=I
H
t (z). With the parameter
values of section 2.6, these ratios are set to 0:0385 when there is no immigration
and to  0:0357 when an immigration shock takes place. So, the e¢ cient insurance
contract in this economy dictates that, when there is immigration, the elderly and
high-skilled workers must pay 3.57% of their total net income to the low-skilled
workers. This percentage increases in the aggregate increase in output it in-
creases in the share of low human capital income in the aggregate income and in
the magnitude of the immigration shock and decreases in the probability that
an immigration occurs11. When there is no immigration, these individuals must
receive 3.85% of their net income. This percentage increases in the share of low
human capital income in the total output, in the magnitude of the immigration
shock and in the probability that an immigration occurs. For the low human
capital workers, we have ~tpLt (0)=I
L
t (0) =  0:1356 and ~tpLt (z)=ILt (z) = 0:186.
11Tedious algebra shows that ~bit (z) =(s
i(zt 1)Rt(z)) = ~t
pH
t (z)=I
H
t (z) =  (0jzt 1) (1  )1+z z,
~bit (0) =(s
i(zt 1)Rt(0)) = ~t
pH
t (0)=I
H
t (0) = (zjzt 1) (1  )1+(+)z z, but ~tpLt (z)=ILt (z) =
(0jzt 1) (+)+(1  )	(zt 1)1 	(zt 1)(1+z) z and ~t
pL
t (0)=I
L
t (0) =  (zjzt 1) (+)+(1  )	(zt 1)(1 	(zt 1))(1+(+)z) z.
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5. The Welfare State of an Open Economy.
How should the previous analysis be altered in the case of an open economy?
First, notice that, if capital mobility is instantaneous and physical capital (and
high human capital) ows into the country at the same speed at which low-skill
immigrants do such that equality is restored between the internal rate of return
on capital and the one established on the international capital markets, the immi-
gration shock has no relevance whatsoever because neither the wage of the native
workers nor the return on capital of the native capital owners will be a¤ected
by the arrival of new workers. In this context, e¢ cient and frictionless capital
markets may act as insurance devices that render the state-contingent assets es-
sentially redundant. This is an interesting result because it suggests that, in the
light of the simulations presented earlier, the trade decit that follows an immi-
gration shock is benecial to both the native and immigrant households in terms
of consumption and overall utility.
This observation helps explain, at least in part, what we observed in Spain
from 1996 until the arrival of the global nancial crisis in 2007-200812: as the ow
of immigration into the country continued and even increased, Spains external
trade decit ballooned but productivity did not move. Along the lines of our
model, these facts have the following interpretation: capital ew into Spain at a
very high rate if not at the same rate at which labor was entering, which prevented
the capital labor ratio and the real wage of unskilled workers from falling. Analysis
of the actual data is di¢ cult but not impossible by means of a model as simplied
as this, in which there is no distinction between durable and non-durable goods
and one period lasts roughly thirty years of which we have observed at most half
since the immigration shock rst hit. To put it di¤erently, if one takes our model
literally, there is no sense in which it can be used to study the Spanish case because
we have not yet completely observed even a single "model period" in the actual
data.
Nevertheless, a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation based on our model
should tell us how much the immigration shock contributed to the Spanish trade
decit of 1996-2007. Therefore, assume that capital entered Spain at roughly the
rate needed year after year to keep the internal capital labor ratio constant. We
do know that, on average, the educational level of immigrants is very similar to
12As we have noted in the introduction, similar results can be obtained in other examples of
large immigration shocks like for Israel in early nineties or Canada with the turn of the twentieth
century.
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that of natives, but immigrants are more likely to be overeducated in their current
jobs than are natives13. Let us assume for simplicity that the skill distribution
of the immigrant workers is similar to the skill distribution of the native workers.
This assumption can provide us with a useful benchmark.
The following is the bottom line of the calculation. In Spain, the annual
K/Y ratio was approximately 2.9 without housing and 4.0 with housing in 1996.
Employment in 1996 was still approximately 12.8 M, and it was 20.3 M in 2007,
of which 2.7 M were immigrants. The K/Y ratio increased slowly during the
expansion and reached approximately 3.1 in 2007. Hence, the immigrants added
almost 21% to the original work force, but they were approximately 13% of the
2007 work force. Take a number in between (i.e., 17%) to account for the fact
that this process took place over roughly a decade (a little less, in fact). Because a
period in our model is about three times as long as the amount of time considered
in the data, everything should be scaled accordingly.
This implies that, if (i) the immigrants came without any K, (ii) the saving
rate of the natives remained constant (it roughly did), which means that the
national savings supplied the K needed by the natives if Spain was in a steady
state before 1996, and, (iii) the nal capital-labor ratio for immigrants is similar
to those for natives, then Spain would have had to borrow the resources needed
to increase its original stock of K by approximately 17% from abroad. In fact,
the number is larger because, on top of the 2.7 M immigrant workers, we have
approximately another 4.0 M native workers who became employed and were not
o¢ cially employed when the expansion period started. The quantitative problem
with the native workers is more complicated because a part of them were most
likely already working in the underground economy (hence, their K already ex-
isted), part had accumulated savings they invested in their own K, etc. In any
case, because the employment growth attributable to natives would only add to
our estimated demand for capital to be imported from abroad, the reference value
of 17% based only on the immigrant inow is a very reasonable lower bound.
In summary, when applied to the 1996-2007 period, our simplied model pre-
dicts that Spain should have imported an amount of capital equal to at least 17%
13According to the Spanish Labor Force Survey, the immigrant population presents, on aver-
age, a very similar educational level as that of natives. In 2007, 57% of Spanish employees had
completed at least high school, which is the same number we found for the immigrant employees.
Although it is true that native employees are more likely to have a college level education that
are immigrant employees (35.8% to 20.7%), immigrants are more likely to be overeducated in
their current jobs than are natives (in the sense that their level of education is above of their
occupational category).
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of its initial capital stock if the international capital markets were functioning
properly. Notice that "imported" here means "net import" because there is no
export in our model: import in the model is equal to the trade decit in the
national income accounts. This means that Spain had to import a little less than
1/5 of its original stock of capital over a period of approximately 11 years, which
is approximately 1.5-1.6% of its capital stock per year every year between 1996
and 2007. Because the K/Y averaged approximately 3.0 (4.0 when housing is con-
sidered) during those years, this implies that something between a lower bound
of 4.5% and an upper bound of 6.4% of GNP had to be imported each year. That
yields a cumulated total import of between 50% and 71% of the Spanish GNP,
everything else equal. Between 1996 and 2007, the actual trade decit adds up to
50.7% of GNP with an annual average of 4.2%. Is this mere chance? Maybe.
6. Conclusions
We have carried out a straightforward exercise. We built the simplest dynamic
model in which immigration shocks have both aggregate and distributional e¤ects,
which a¤ect some parts of the population di¤erently from others. In particular,
in our model, a positive immigration shock increases the labor supply of unskilled
middle-aged workers, which makes the high-skill workers and the (older) owners
of capital better o¤ apart from increasing GNP. Next, we asked how a system of
(sequentially) complete nancial markets would handle such shocks and charac-
terized the properties of the sequentially complete market allocations (SCMA).
Finally, we asked two types of questions. First, if nancial markets were not com-
plete in a practically meaningful sense, what type of welfare policies could bring
back the SCMA? Second, if international capital markets were frictionless, how
much capital should a country import to insure itself against the immigration
shock? Our analysis provides us with four interesting lessons, which we can apply
to the case of Spain (1996-2007).
Lesson number 1: immigration shocks have large impacts not only on aggre-
gate output but also on its composition and income distribution. Absent complete
nancial markets, such impacts should be properly managed by well-planned gov-
ernment policies of the form we have described. It is at least dubious that such
policies were implemented in Spain during the period under consideration. The
absence of such policies has clear detrimental e¤ects not only on welfare but also
on human capital accumulation and overall economic growth.
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Lesson number 2: the trade decit and borrowing from abroad can be a sub-
stitute for the missing internal insurance markets. Spain received a very large
number of immigrants, and this would have had a dramatic impact on produc-
tivity and income distribution if the trade decit had not allowed the country
to accumulate capital stock much faster than the national savings rate allowed.
This generated a large trade decit but increased output, wages, consumption
and overall welfare. The same could be said of other countries that have increased
their trade decit after su¤ering heavy immigration shocks, such as in Israel in
the early 1990s.
Lesson number 3: the debate over the impact of immigration on Spanish society
and the economy seems to be missing some key factors. In the model presented
here, we have outlined some of these factors and paid particular attention to
education and pensions. In particular, we have shown that an optimal policy
response to a large immigration ow requires a reduction of pension payments
and an increase in education investments.
Lesson number 4: even simple stylized models can facilitate the investigation of
di¢ cult issues in economic policy and are capable of shedding new light on issues
that are often forgotten or considered too complicated to be addressed formally.
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Appendix A: Analytical illustration
In this analytic example, we consider an economy with logarithmic utility and
Cobb Douglas production functions: u(c) = log c; F (K;H;L) = AKHL1  
and h (di; hyi) = B(di) (hyi)1 .
Write W i(zt) = !i(zt)h(dit 1; h
yi
t 1) +A
yi
t 1(zt); which is the net income of indi-
vidual i in period t and state zt. From (3:c); we have, for a native middle-aged of
type i,
q(z; zt) =
(zjzt)
Amit (z)
h
W i(zt)  eAmi(zt)i 8z 2 Z;
where eAmi(zt) =Pz2Z q(z; zt)Amit (z). Multiplying this byAmit (z) and aggregating
it in z 2 Z; we arrive at the total demand for contingent securities of native
middle-aged individuals of either type,
eAmi(zt) = 
1 + 
W i(zt):
The demand for consumption in middle age and the demand for each component
Amit (z) of Ami(zt) are
cmi(zt) =
1
1 + 
W i(zt) and Amit (z) =

1 + 
W i(zt)
(zjzt)
q(z; zt)
:
Write W (zt) = !L(zt)hmLt . For an immigrant in t; we obtain
eAm(zt) = 
1 + 
W (zt), cm(zt) =
1
1 + 
W (zt) and Amt (z) =

1 + 
W (zt)
(zjzt)
q(z; zt)
:
Using condition (3:b) and the rst order conditions for the rm, we have
dH (zt 1)N
yH
t 1 =


Kt and dL (zt 1)N
yL
t 1 =
(1    )

	(zt 1)Kt;
where 	(zt 1) = Et 1fpt(z) (1 + z)  g=Et 1fpt(z) (1 + z)1  g. From (3:a);
we have pt (z) cmit (z) = pt (0) c
mi
t (0), for i = H;L. Then, using the condition for
the rm (1:c) and the consumer budget restriction (2:c); we obtain the demand
for each component Ayit 1 (z) of Ayi(z):
Ayit 1 (z) =
Et 1

pt (z)!
i
t(z)h(d
i
t 1; h
yi
t 1)  dit 1't(z)
	
pt (z)
  !it(z)h(dit 1; hyit 1).
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It is important to note that, in the SCMA, the net income during middle age
in equilibrium is equal to Et 1

pt (z)!
i
t(z)h(d
i
t 1; h
yi
t 1)  dit 1't(z)
	
=p (zt). Now,
using (6:c)-(6:d) and taking into account thatAmit (z) = eAmi(zt)(zjzt)=q(z; zt) and
Amt (z) =
eAm(zt)(zjzt)=q(z; zt), we have the aggregate demand for each compo-
nent Ayt 1 (z) of Ay(z):X
i=H;L
Ayit 1(z)N
yi
t 1 =  D (zt 1)
(zjzt 1)
q (z; zt 1)
+Kt

't (z)
pt (z)
  (zjzt 1)
q (z; zt 1)

:
Finally, from (1); we obtain the equilibrium prices for each period t and state z
2 Z :
!Ht (z) = AK

t Ht
 1Lt (z)
1  
!Lt (z) = (1    )AKt HtLt (z)  
't(z) = pt (z)AK
 1
t Ht
Lt (z)
1  
q(z; zt) =
(zjzt)pt+1 (z)
Et
n
pt+1 (z)AK
 1
t+1 Ht+1
Lt+1 (z)
1  
o :
Note also that, in equilibrium, pt(z)cmit (z) = pt(0)c
mi
t (0). Substituting the values
of cmit (z) and c
mi
t (0); we arrive to pt (z) = pt (0) (1 + z)
+ = (1 + (+ ) z), where
(1 + z)+ < 1 + (+ ) z and we normalize pt (0) = 1.
Given initial conditions for

K0; H0; L0; N
oi
0 ; N
mi
0 ; N
yi
0 ; A
yi
 1 (z0) ; A
mi
 1 (z0) ; A
f
 1 (z0)

,
the following system describes the dynamic of the economy for a given sequence of
shocks (z0; z1; :::) and a sequence of endowments of basic knowledges
n
hyHt ; h
yL
t
o1
t=0
=n
Ht=N
yH
t ; Lt=N
yL
t
o1
t=0
,
Kt+1 = 
(zt; zt 1)AKt H

t L
1  
t ; (A.1)
Ht+1 = B


 (zt; zt 1)


AKt H
+1 
t L
(1  )
t ; (A.2)
L (zt+1) = (1 + zt+1)B

(1    )	 (zt) 
 (zt; zt 1)


AKt H

t L
1  
t ;(A.3)
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where

 (zt; zt 1) =

(1 + ) (zt)

1  (1 + (+ ) zt)(zt 1)
(1 + zt)

(0) +
(z) (1 + z)
(1 + (+ ) z)

;
(zt 1) = 1 +


( + (1    )	 (zt 1)) ;
and
	(zt 1) =
(0jzt 1) + (zjzt 1) 11+(+)z
(0jzt 1) + (zjzt 1) (1+z)1+(+)z
:
Given a sequence of shocks (z0; z1; ::), the evolution of the factor intensity
ratios ~k = K=L and ~h = H=L are given by
~k (zt+1) =
(A
 (zt; zt 1))
1 
(1 + zt+1)B

(1  )	(zt)

 ~k(1 )t ~h(1 )t
~h (zt+1) =
1
(1 + zt+1)


(1    )	 (zt)

~h
(1 )
t :
Set (zt; zt+1; zt+2; :::) = (0; 0; 0; :::). The rays
~h =

(1    )	 (0) and
~k =
264 (
 (0; 0))1 
B

(1  )	(0)

  (1    )	 (0)
(1 )375
1
1 (1 )
dene a balanced growth path. For all the initial conditions (H0; K0; L0) 2 <2+,
the iteration of (A:1)  (A:3) leads (Ht; Kt; Lt) to the rays ~h and ~k.
Along the balanced growth path, the three stocks of capital expand (or con-
tract) at the factor
1 + g = 
(0; 0)A
264 (
 (0; 0))1 
B

(1  )	(0)


375
 1
1 (1 ) 

(1    )	 (0)
 
1 (1 )
:
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